Perspectives

Perspectives from the people doing the work

Insights on technology, AI, investment, and leadership from executives who have built, scaled, and transformed companies.

Ebook
Technology Decisions That Compound
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Technology Decisions That Compound
A practical framework for winning technology decisions that shape company value — for CEOs, boards, and investors.
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One-Way Door Decision-Making Framework
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One-Way Door Decision-Making Framework
How to distinguish irreversible decisions from reversible ones — and why the difference determines competitive speed.
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Building Alexa at Amazon
Book • Amazon
Building Alexa at Amazon: Innovating from Vision to Scale
The inside story of how Amazon built one of history's fastest-growing consumer products — by Techquity partner Al Lindsay.
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Blog
Effective AI Transformation Demands “Hands in the Dirt” Partners
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Effective AI Transformation Demands “Hands in the Dirt” Partners
Blog
Techquity Calls for Organizations to Go All-In on AI
Blog • AI
Techquity Calls for Organizations to Go All-In on AI — or Risk Being Left Behind
Elite tech advisory firm Techquity outlines why organizations that delay AI adoption face an accelerating competitive gap.
AI • Engineering
AI Moved the Bottleneck. You’re Still Solving for Headcount.

A few months ago, a CTO told me something that would have sounded absurd five years ago: “I’m no longer sure how many production systems we’re actually running.” He wasn’t describing a chaotic startup. He was describing a well-funded, competently led technology organization that had moved fast on internal tooling, automation, and AI-assisted development. They had built a lot. They had just lost track of everything they had built.

That conversation stayed with me. Because it isn’t an isolated case. It’s a preview.

For about twenty years, the central constraint in software was straightforward: could you find enough engineers to build what the business needed? Headcount was the lever. More developers meant more output. That equation shaped how companies hired, how teams were structured, and how engineering was valued.

AI is changing that equation, but most of the commentary gets the implication wrong.

The dominant narrative is something like: AI writes code, therefore fewer developers are needed. That argument feels intuitive, but it also misreads what happens when a production input gets dramatically cheaper: volume explodes.

The pattern has played out before, in adjacent domains, and the outcome of easier production has never been less of it. It has always been more.

Excel didn’t create fewer spreadsheets. It created an explosion of them. Analysis that was previously impractical became routine. WordPress didn’t reduce the number of websites. It opened web publishing to organizations and individuals who were previously locked out by cost and complexity. Smartphones didn’t shrink video production. They created entirely new industries of content that hadn’t existed before.

Each time, the underlying dynamic was the same: when something becomes cheaper and easier to produce, demand doesn’t hold steady at its prior level. It expands, often into territory that wasn’t even considered before, because the cost had made it unthinkable.

This is the part most people miss. Technology rarely removes a constraint. It moves it. The only question that matters is where it went, and whether leadership noticed.

Software scarcity forced prioritization. Software abundance may destroy it.

The historical bottleneck wasn’t that companies lacked ideas for internal tools, workflow automations, integrations, or niche products. It was that building those things cost real engineering time, time that was finite and competed against core product priorities. Dozens of valuable ideas never got built. Leaders made peace with the manual workaround, the shared spreadsheet, the clunky process that everyone tolerated because the alternative required six months of engineering capacity.

AI now collapses that threshold. Problems previously tolerated because building a solution was prohibitively expensive are now in scope. Companies will build more software because building it is suddenly cheap.

But the bottleneck doesn’t disappear. It moves from “can we build it” to something harder.

The bottleneck is now defined by questions like: Can we operate it? Can we trust it? Can we evolve it without the system collapsing under its own complexity? Should we build it at all, given everything else already running underneath it?

And there is a sharper edge to this. Software you have lost track of is not just hard to maintain. It is an attack surface no one is monitoring. Every untracked service, every forgotten integration, every automation with credentials that outlived the person who wrote them is a door left open in a building whose floor plan no longer exists. The breach rarely comes through the system you are watching. It comes through the one you forgot you built.

The work most exposed to AI was already drifting toward industrialized implementation: isolated tickets, repetitive scaffolding, boilerplate assembly detached from system-level understanding. That is precisely the layer large language models compress most effectively. It was always closer to manufacturing than to engineering. The decisions had already been made somewhere upstream. The work was execution against a known pattern: build this endpoint, wire this form, replicate this component. Little of it required judgment about whether the thing should exist or how it would behave once the system around it changed.

That is exactly the layer a model reproduces well, because there was never much judgment encoded in it to begin with.

The engineers who gain leverage are the ones who can turn AI-generated components into systems that remain understandable, governable, and survivable under real operating conditions. People who can see how a quick fix in one place becomes fragility somewhere else, who understand the business trade-offs underneath a technical decision, and who own outcomes instead of tickets.

AI lowers implementation friction while raising governance costs. That gap is where the real exposure lives, and most organizations haven’t priced it in yet.

There’s a second layer that almost no one is talking about clearly.

As software creation gets cheaper, the coordination cost of managing all that software becomes the new tax.

This is already visible in organizations that moved fast on internal tooling. Dozens of internal tools with overlapping functionality and unclear ownership. Automations built by different teams that conflict with each other in production. AI-generated services that no one fully understands, maintained by people who weren’t there when the system was built. Shadow IT expanding faster than any governance structure can absorb. APIs with no documented lifecycle. Features behind flags that were supposed to be temporary and are now three years old.

The problem isn’t that the software is bad. The problem is that it proliferates faster than the organization can develop a clear view of what to keep, what to retire, what to integrate, and what to leave alone.

Cheap software increases the cost of organizational coherence. This is exactly the problem the CTO I spoke to was describing.

So the ability to look at a system and recognize when local optimization is quietly creating systemic fragility — to say this is the wrong shape before the cost of that shape becomes visible in production — becomes more valuable precisely because there is more surface area requiring that kind of scrutiny. Not less valuable. More.

Companies that treat AI as a way to run the same engineering model more cheaply will likely get a short-term gain and a medium-term governance problem. More software accumulated faster, with the same leadership structures that were never designed to manage that kind of proliferation.

Companies that rethink the engineering function toward outcome ownership, systems thinking, and deliberate architecture governance will get the compounding benefit of more software built faster, with enough coherence to actually operate at scale.

For two decades, companies scaled software by adding engineers. They may now discover that software scales faster than the organization’s ability to govern the consequences of building it.

AI did not remove the bottleneck. It shifted its position.

Many organizations are still trying to solve the labor problem. The harder problem is the one the CTO described without naming it: software now accumulates faster than anyone’s ability to track what it does, who owns it, or what breaks when it changes. It no longer scales at the speed of engineering teams. It scales at the speed of how fast an organization loses track of itself.